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Abstract
In this paper we assess the effects of bond financing on firms’ survival during the
1997-98 Asian crisis. Using a novel database covering the period 1995 to 2007 for five
Asian economies most affected by the crisis - Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore
and Thailand - we find strong evidence that the Asian crisis affected both directly and
indirectly (through interactions with financial indicators) the probability of survival.
More importantly, we show that bond issuers, irrespective of the currency denomi-
nation, are more likely to survive compared to non-issuers. Nevertheless, only firms
issuing bonds in local currency are shielded from the adverse effects of the crisis.
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1 Introduction
What is the effect of bond financing on corporate failures? Bolton and Freixas (2008) argue
that bond financing, as a form of long-term finance, does not expose firms to the risks of
bank runs and systemic crises. While bank-financed firms are fully exposed to the risk of
bank loans, bond-financed firms are shielded from the adverse effects of a financial crisis and
therefore are more likely to survive. It is generally accepted that during hard times lenders
are more likely to withhold funds and interrupt lines of credit to less creditworthy firms
forcing some of them to fail.
The main goal of this paper is to quantify the effects (and assess the importance) of
bond financing in influencing firm survival. We do this using a novel dataset that combines
several sources including Thomson Financial Primark, Bondware, Bloomberg, Zephyr and
the Asian Development Bank. We then go further to examine if bond-financed firms are
shielded from the adverse effects of the Asian crisis. Given that bond markets in Asia were
largely underdeveloped during the crisis it is not clear whether access to financial markets
dampened the effects of the crisis. We are able therefore to assess the potential offsetting
role of bond finance in determining business failure. The East Asian twin crisis (currency
and banking crisis) is an ideal setting to study the link between firms’ survival and access
to bond markets because during this period most corporations were heavily dependent on
domestic and foreign bank finance to supplement internal funds for investment, with smaller
and medium sized enterprises almost exclusively reliant on domestic bank loans. When the
crisis erupted the funding to banks and then to corporations fell dramatically, and in the
absence of local corporate bond markets to provide an alternative source of funding the
effects of the crisis were amplified (Eichengreen et al. (2006)).
The theoretical motivation for the role of bond financing in survival is related to the
‘track record’ reputation that firms can establish in the bond market. Reputation, which
is a concept that was made popular by Diamond (1991), is based on the history of firms’
credit risk and can be used to access the bond market under favourable terms. Firms with
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access to bond markets are able to bear the significant fixed cost of issuing a bond, which is
generally higher than the fixed cost of taking out a bank loan, and thus to give a good signal
to lenders for their reputation. These reputational effects may become even more relevant
during periods of economic crises where bond issuers might be able to overcome financial
problems by extending external finance and re-negotiating existing bank loans. For example,
banks could re-schedule the loans for issuers and trade creditors may extend their funding
to support customers with long-lasting relationships. This may not be the case for bank
dependent non-issuing firms that do not have established a track record in the market. Non-
issuers therefore may find it more expensive to obtain external funding at times of hardship.
These considerations suggest that reputational effects for bond issuers can be beneficial for
their survival, especially during economic crises.
Figure 1 presents prima facie evidence suggesting that East Asian firms with access to
bond markets may be better equipped to weather systemic crises. Using our data to compare
issuers and non-issuers, we show that the latter category exhibits significantly more failures
throughout the sample period. Importantly, this difference is even more pronounced during
the crisis. For example, in the year 1997 the number of failing firms that do not have
access in the bond market (non-issuers) is about 12 times higher compared to bond issuers.
This startling difference between issuers and non-issuers maybe explained by the fact that
the former group of firms has an established ‘track record’ in the market and therefore is
associated with the lower degree of informational asymmetry.
Our work is related to three different strands of literature. First, we build on the empirical
and theoretical literature that looks at the importance of financial status and borrowing
constraints on firms’ survival and concludes that firms in bad financial shape are more likely
to fail (see Zingales (1998); Bunn and Redwood (2003); Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006);
Farinha and Santos (2006) and Bridges and Guariglia (2008)). A second relevant strand
of literature has emphasised the important role of macroeconomic environment on survival.
Alvarez and Go¨rg (2009) offer evidence from Latin America and Bhattcharjee et al. (2009)
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from the UK showing that changes in the macroeconomic environment may interact with
relevant firm and industry features in amplifying exit hazards. A third related line of work
is the literature on the emerging economies financial development. According to BIS (2005)
reports, the development of the financial system in general will help firms to better endure
financial crises and avoid currency mismatches. However, the progress of development in
Asia, especially for corporate bonds, remains painfully slow (Borensztein et al. (2006) and
Eichengreen et al. (2006)).
The value added of the present paper is threefold. First, we look at the role of bond
financing in firms’ survival. It is well known that in the presence of information asymmetries
in capital markets, firms prefer internal to external finance, but at some point as firms grow,
self-funding typically becomes insufficient to finance their investment projects and so they
turn to sources of external finance from the markets, in preferential order for equity, debt
and banks.1 In this paper, we focus on bond finance and investigate whether being a bond
issuer is more of an advantage in attenuating failure hazards. We also consider the currency
denomination of bonds, distinguishing between domestic and foreign issued bonds. Second,
we examine the link between firm survival and the 1997-98 East Asian crisis controlling
for a number of firm-specific, industry-specific indicators and macroeconomic factors. We
explore the direct and the indirect effect (through interactions with financial indicators) of
the financial crisis on firm survival, using comparable micro level panel of five economies -
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand - that were hit the hardest during this
period. Finally, the implications of the crisis on survival are assessed for bond issuers and
non-issuers as well as for domestic and foreign currency bonds.
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. Section two illustrates the empirical
specifications and the econometric methodology. In Section three we present a descriptive
analysis of our data. Section four presents the empirical evidence. In section five we check
the robustness of our findings. Section six concludes the paper.
1This sequence arises from the ‘pecking-order’ hypothesis by Myers and Majluf (1984) and a literature
has developed to explore the composition of external finance based on this hypothesis.
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2 Empirical implementation
Probit models are commonly used in the related empirical literature (for example Zingales
(1998); Greenaway et al. (2008) and Baggs et al. (2009)). However, the issue of endogeneity in
our empirical specifications, which are enriched with a set of firm-specific financial indicators,
is likely to be of particular importance. 2 We address this issue by allowing the firm-specific
variables to be endogenous and then instrumenting for them through a two-stage procedure.
Our approach to employ instrumental variable techniques in the estimations is formally
justified by using a Wald test of exogeneity. We report p-values of the test at the foot of the
tables of results. In all cases the Wald test emphatically rejects the null of exogeneity in our
regressors vindicating our endogenous approach.
Our empirical specifications are motivated by Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) who de-
velop a theory of borrowing constraints and study its implications for firm survival among
other firm dynamics. Their model generates a role for capital structure in an asymmetric
information setup.3 We specify a baseline model as follows:
Pr(FAILit = 1) = F (a0 + a1LEV ERAGEit + a2PROFITit + a3COLLATERALit + a4SIZEit
+ a5SIZE2it + a6AGEit + a7EXCHANGEt + a8MESj + ²it) (2.1)
where FAIL is a dummy variable that equals 1 if firm i fails in year t, and 0 otherwise.
We define a firm as failed in a given year when its company status is that of dead.4 F (.)
denotes the standard normal distribution function.
To incorporate a role for finance in the survival model, as suggested by Clementi and
2 As it has been emphasised for linear models, endogeneity in binary choice models results in biased
coefficients and, therefore, incorrect inferences ( Maddala (1983) and Rivers and Vuong (1988)).
3The theoretical frameworks on survival were firstly introduced by Hopehayn (1992) and Jovanovic (1982)
without considering a role for moral hazard.
4We elaborate on the construction of the failure dummy in the next section. Note that we use the terms
failure and survival interchangeably.
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Hopenhayn (2006), we consider three dimensions of financial health from the balance sheet,
namely leverage, profitability and collateral assets. The financial condition of the firm is
an important determinant of firm failure as argued by Zingales (1998), Bunn and Red-
wood (2003) and Bridges and Guariglia (2008). Considering the likely response of leverage
(LEV ERAGE), as measured by the firm’s total debt to total assets, we remark that high
levels of existing debt are associated with a worse balance sheet situation, which would
increase moral hazard and adverse selection problems, and lead to the inability of firms
to obtain external finance at a reasonable cost (see Levin et al. (2004)). Zingales (1998),
Farinha and Santos (2006) and Bridges and Guariglia (2008) show that highly leveraged car-
riers, start-ups and domestic firms are less likely to survive. We expect therefore a positive
relationship between leverage and the probability of failure.
The next financial component is a profitability ratio (PROFITABILITY ) defined as
the ratio of the firm’s profits before interests and tax to its total assets. Following Bunn
and Redwood (2003) and Bridges and Guariglia (2008) we use this measure to proxy for the
firm’s ability to generate profits. We anticipate a positive relationship between profitability
and the likelihood of survival.
As an additional financial indicator we include a measure of tangible assets, which indi-
cates the firm’s ability to pledge collateral for debt finance (COLLATERAL). Assets that
are more tangible sustain more external financing because tangibility increases the value that
can be recaptured by creditors in case of borrower’s default. Collateral has also been found
to affect firms’ chances of survival. Farinha and Santos (2006) and Bridges and Guariglia
(2008) document that firms with a larger fraction of tangibles in their balance sheets are
more likely to survive for a longer period of time. Thus, we expect a negative relationship
between collateral and the incidence of failure.
In addition to financial characteristics our specifications include a choice of control vari-
ables guided by the existing empirical and theoretical literature on the determinants of firm
survival. It is recognised that a firm’s size plays an important role in determining firm fail-
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ure, (Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006)), and is expected to decrease the incidence of failure.
Large firms tend to face lower barriers in accessing the capital markets, while smaller firms
with more severe information problems tend to face a higher risk of insolvency and illiq-
uidity and consequently a higher risk of failure (Mata and Portugal (1994); Audretsch and
Mahmood (1995) and Dunne et al. (1998)). Hence, we introduce size (SIZE) measured as
the logarithm of the firm’s real total assets.5 We also incorporate its square (SIZE2) to
allow for non-linearities. Further, we include firms’ age since firms with an established track
record are less likely to fail than those that are younger because new entrants face a greater
risk of failure due to the ‘liability of newness’ effect (Stinchcombe (1965)). A large number
of empirical and theoretical papers have shown that younger firms are more likely to fail (e.g
Jovanovic (1982); Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) and Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006))
and this would be the case both for domestic and multinational firms as noted by Go¨rg and
Strobl (2002). Thus we introduce age (AGE) which measures the number of years a firm
has been listed on the stock exchange.
We also attempt to control for macroeconomic and industry-specific conditions in our
models. To this end we control for macroeconomic effects by adding the exchange rate, which
measures the exchange rate environment. Baggs et al. (2009) document a negative association
between survival and appreciation of the Canadian dollar. We expect the exchange rate
(EXCHANGE) to be positively associated with the firm’s probability to fail. To control
for economies of scale of the industry, we add the minimum efficient scale of the industry
(MES), measured as the log of median output in sector j.6 Empirical evidence concerning
the influence of MES on firm survival is ambiguous. At one extreme, one might expect firms
entering industries with large minimum efficient scale to have lower probabilities of survival
than firms entering other industries, Mata and Portugal (1994). At the other extreme,
industries with high MES are usually also industries showing high price cost margins, which
5To check the robustness of our results we use two alternative measures of size such as the number of
employees and real sales. Our results, not reported here for brevity, remain largely unaffected.
6We also employ the MES defined as the log of median employment size in the industry, used by Go¨rg
and Strobl (2003). Results remain largely unchanged.
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should increase firm survival (Audretsch (1991)). We expect MES to significantly affect firm
survival but its sign will be determined by the data.
In order to establish whether firms’ survival prospects change during periods of adverse
economic events compared to tranquil periods, we model the determinants of firm survival
and check whether the occurrence of a financial crisis is a statistically significant determinant
of firms’ probability of failure. To do so we include a time period dummy (CRISIS) that
takes the value of one in years 1997-98, and zero otherwise. The direct effect of the financial
crisis on failure is shown from the sign and significance of the coefficient a9.
Pr(FAILit = 1) = F (a0 + a1LEV ERAGEit + a2PROFITit + a3COLLATERALit + a4SIZEit
+ a5SIZE2it + a6AGEit + a7EXCHANGEt + a8MESj + a9CRISISit + ²it) (2.2)
To examine the differential impact of the Asian crisis on firm survival, we include inter-
action terms of the crisis dummy with the financial indicators [Financial indicator*Crisis,
Financial indicator*(1−Crisis)]. This specification provides us with the indirect effect of
the financial crisis on business failures, since we allow for the fact that firms with varying
levels of profits, debt and collateral might respond to the crisis disproportionately.
At the next stage we specify an empirical model including the term BOND which is a
dummy equal to 1 if firm i issues a bond in year t, and 0 otherwise. Thus, we record the
bond history in each firm. This specification is aimed at capturing the direct impact of bond
finance on firm survival. The direct effect is judged from the sign and significance of the
coefficient a9. The estimated model is specified as follows:
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Pr(FAILit = 1) = F (a0 + a1LEV ERAGEit + a2PROFITit + a3COLLATERALit + a4SIZEit
+ a5SIZE2it + a6AGEit + a7EXCHANGEt + a8MESj + a9BONDit + ²it) (2.3)
Equation (2.3) is modified to include interactions between bond issuers and non-issuers
with the crisis dummy to show variations in firms’ survival prospects. This test is motivated
by the theoretical argument by Bolton and Freixas (2008), that bond-financed firms are
shielded from the direct effect of a financial crisis. We focus on the sign and significance of
the coefficients a9 and a10, where we suggest that the influence of bond finance is determined
in conjunction with the Asian crisis.
Pr(FAILit = 1) = F (a0 + a1LEV ERAGEit + a2PROFITit + a3COLLATERALit + a4SIZEit
+ a5SIZE2it + a6AGEit + a7EXCHANGEt + a8MESj + a9BONDit ∗ CRISISit
+ a10(1−BONDit) ∗ CRISISit + ²it) (2.4)
Finally, we model the differential impact of currency denomination of bonds on the
incidence of failure during the 1997-98 crisis.
3 Data
3.1 Data description
The data for this paper are drawn from different sources including Thomson Financial Pri-
mark, Bondware, Bloomberg, Zephyr and the Asian Development Bank. These are combined
in a new way to cast light on the probability of failure in the Asian region. The data cover
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firms in emerging Asia mostly affected by the 1997-98 crisis - Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
Singapore and Thailand. The time period is 1995 through 2007, which covers the period
of the East Asian crisis and the aftermath of the crisis which has been characterised by a
significant regional development in terms of size, liquidity and sophistication.
The Thomson Financial Primark database offers balance sheet and profit and loss ac-
counts data for firms in the East Asian region. Our initial dataset includes a total of 28,445
annual observations on 4,651 companies. We provide information on financial accounts and
ratios for Asian firms operating in all sectors of the economy.
The data on bond issues are drawn from Bondware and Bloomberg. We use Bondware
to identify all corporate bonds issued in international markets and we use Bloomberg to
identify similar data for firms that issue bonds in the domestic Asian markets. Our coverage
of bond issues therefore embraces both firms with issues in hard currencies, which are almost
exclusively US dollar denominated, and firms with local currency denominated bonds. Before
the crisis, issuance in local currency bonds by corporations was very limited but in the post-
crisis period it went up significantly (see Fernandez and Klassen (2004) and Burger et al.
(2009)). In our data 55% of bonds are denominated in domestic currency and the remaining
45% in foreign currency. Data on exchange rates, which are meant to proxy for changes in
the macroeconomy, are taken from the Asian Development Bank.
We use Zephyr to obtain data on mergers and acquisitions for the sampled firms. Thom-
son Financial Primark reports firms as ‘dead’ but it may be possible that some firms could
be recorded as ‘dead’ not because they failed but because they merged with another firm
instead. Employing Zephyr we are able to identify and drop those firms that are mistakenly
coded as ‘dead’ in our data. This will ensure that our dependent variable has been accu-
rately constructed to capture firms that failed and did not exit the sample due to mergers
and acquisitions.
Following normal selection criteria used in the literature, we exclude companies that did
not have complete records for all explanatory variables and firm-years with negative sales. To
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control for the potential influence of outliers, we exclude observations in the 0.5 percent from
upper and lower tails of the distribution of the regression variables. Our combined sample
contains data for 358 firms in Indonesia, 917 in Korea, 871 in Malaysia, 596 in Singapore
and 530 in Thailand, a total of 3,272 firms. Finally, by allowing for both entry and exit,
the panel has an unbalanced structure which helps mitigate potential selection and survivor
bias.
3.2 Sample analysis
We begin our analysis by showing the evolution of failures over time in Figure 2. This
figure shows that our sample is dominated by firms that failed in 1997 which coincided with
the onset of the Asian crisis. Apart from this period the distribution of failures over time
is reasonably stable. Summary statistics for the variables used in our empirical analysis
are provided in Table 1. Means and standard deviations of the firm-specific variables and
financial indicators are presented for the total sample (column 1), for failed and surviving
firms (columns 2 and 3) and for those firms that are issuers and those that are non-issuers
(columns 5 and 6). Further, the p-values of a test for the equality of means are presented
in columns 4 and 7. Looking at columns 2 and 3 we observe that surviving firms are larger
than failed firms. This finding implies that firm size is an important determinant in business
failures. The proxy for age shows that survivors are also longer listed on the stock exchange
suggesting that those firms that are able to build track record in the market are more likely
to reduce the incidence of failure. Regarding the financial variables, surviving firms display
higher levels of profitability, they are more collateralized and less indebted. Further, they are
more likely to be bond issuers and less likely to be affected by the crisis. These differences
between sub-samples are statistically significant in all cases.
On the basis of bond financing (columns 5 and 6), we observe that the average firm’s
failure rate for non-issuers (0.106) is almost 1.5 times higher than the corresponding figure
for bond issuers (0.066). These statistics highlight the importance of bond financing in at-
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tenuating exit hazards. We find that firms with access to bond finance are larger, confirming
the information asymmetry problem that small firms face (see Calomiris et al. (1995)). We
also observe that bond issuers are more leveraged, consistent with the notion that higher
levels of leverage is often perceived as a good sign of borrowing capacity in the bond markets
(see Dennis and Mihov (2003)). They also have lower levels of profitability and collateral
compared to non-issuers. The former finding shows that more profitable firms may find it op-
timum to delay their entry to bond markets consistent with the limited liquidity assumption.
The latter result implies that having more tangible assets is not necessarily an advantage
for bond issuance, unlike for bank finance where tangible assets can be pledged as collateral.
In addition, bond issuers are less likely to fail during the financial crisis (0.079) in contrast
with non-issuers (0.143).
In summary, these preliminary statistics suggest that firms’ failure rates are largely re-
lated to bond finance, financial healthiness and the crisis. It remains to be seen, however,
whether these findings continue to hold when we control for a number of factors which are
known to play a role in survival models. In the sections that follow we provide formal econo-
metric analysis of the determinants of firm failures, the effect of financial crisis, and the role
of bond financing.
4 Main results
4.1 The direct and indirect effect of the Asian crisis on failure
We begin our enquiry with a baseline model of business failure as shown in Equation (2.1).
Table 2, column 1 summarises the results of the IV Probit where the probability of failure
is modelled as a function of the firm-specific control variables, financial indicators, industry
characteristics and macroeconomic conditions. This model is aimed at evaluating the impact
of financial health on survival probabilities. The predicted probability of exit, evaluated at
the mean of the independent variables is 7.3%, which is close to the actual exit rates reported
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in the summary statistics. To provide some interpretation of the estimated coefficients in
column 1, we also report the marginal changes, evaluated at the sample means for each
variable.
Financial indicators have the expected impact on firms’ failure. In particular, firms
with high levels of LEV ERAGE face higher probabilities of failure compared to those with
low leverage confirming previous reported empirical evidence (Zingales (1998); Farinha and
Santos (2006) and Bridges and Guariglia (2008)). High levels of debt would increase moral
hazard and asymmetric information problems, and would lead to a higher probability of
failure. The effect is economically important since a one percent increase in leverage would
raise the probability of failure by 2.7%. This implies a reduction in the predicted exit
probability by 37% (2.7/7.3).
Next, PROFITABILITY measures the extent to which high-profitable firms face a
lower risk of failure. It enters with the expected negative sign implying that an increase in
profitability ratio lowers the hazard of failure. Marginal changes suggest that a one percent
increase in firms’ profits would decrease failure rates by 0.07%. This result is consistent with
previous findings that more profitable firms are less likely to fail (Bunn and Redwood (2003)
and Bridges and Guariglia (2008)).
The coefficient on COLLATERAL, the proxy for the degree of firms’ collateralization,
attracts the expected negative sign and it has a highly significant impact on firms’ failure
prospects. Firms with high levels of tangible assets are able to pledge collateral and to obtain
more external funding but also to pursue risk-shifting strategies (Bridges and Guariglia
(2008) and Farinha and Santos (2006)). This effect is economically important since increasing
collateral by one percent would reduce the incidence of failure by 4.86%.
With respect to our firm-specific controls, the results on SIZE and SIZE2 indicate that
there is a non-linear relationship between firm size and the likelihood of survival. A significant
coefficient of the squared logarithm of real total assets shows that the advantages of a bigger
size decrease with increasing size, with the turning point being 12. The coefficient on firm
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AGE exerts a negative and significant impact on failure. This finding is in line with previous
theoretical and empirical evidence which shows that younger firms that lack reputation in
the market are more likely to fail (e.g Jovanovic (1982); Audretsch and Mahmood (1995)
and Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006)).
The results on the MES and the exchange rate (EXCHANGE) behave as conjectured.
Firms operating in industries with high MES are more likely to survive, which is consistent
with Audretsch (1991), whereas the proxy for the macroeconomic condition attains a positive
effect on failure which supports the theory that a stronger local currency raises the probability
of firms to fail (Baggs et al. (2009)).
To assess the role of the East Asian financial crisis on firms’ likelihood of failure, we first
focus on the direct impact of the crisis on the probability of survival using the time-period
CRISIS to indicate that firms faced the Asian crisis by estimating Equation (2.2). The
third column of Table 2 shows that the coefficients on the control variables size, size squared,
age, MES and EXCHANGE retain their signs and their significant impact on survival. As
before, financial indicators also affect significantly firms’ probability of failure. Focusing on
the impact of the financial crisis dummy on the likelihood of failure we observe that during
1997 and 1998, East Asian firms were more likely to fail. More precisely, the coefficient on the
dummy shows the positive and highly significant effect on the hazard of failure. Looking at
column 4, the marginal change is 7.71% supporting the view that during downturns economic
activity faces a general slowdown which is likely to affect bank credit, business profitability
and survival among other firms’ real decisions.
To further scrutinise the impact of the financial crisis on the hazard of failure, we look into
the indirect effect (through interactions with financial characteristics) of the crisis dummy on
failure. We interact our financial indicators, leverage, profitability and collateral, with the
Crisis and (1−Crisis) dummy to capture the sensitivity of survival to financial indicators in
and out of the financial crisis. Imperfect capital markets generate a transmission mechanism
through which an economic shock can generate large and persistent domestic balance sheet
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effects.7 Previous evidence suggests that there is significant difference in the response of firms’
real activities in periods of recession versus non-recession (Gertler and Gilchrist (1994)).
Thus, our objective is to check whether the impact of the financial crisis on failure can be
amplified by firms with weak financial health.
The results in Table 3 reveal that all financial indicators (with the exception of prof-
itability) present higher coefficients during the crisis compared to their coefficients out of the
crisis and these are statistically different from each other.8 The findings are economically
important since a percentage increase in leverage would raise the probability of failure by
8.3% during the recession period and by only 1.07% during tranquil periods. The importance
of good financial health in periods of economic slowdown is also observed on the coefficient
for collateral. High levels of tangible assets boost the survival prospects of East Asian firms
especially during the crisis. Marginal changes suggest that a percentage increase in collat-
eral would reduce the incidence of failure by 22.43% during the crisis and by 15.45% out of
the crisis. To summarise, we find that financial indicators are more important in explaining
business failures during the financial crisis compared to tranquil periods, revealing that firms
in good financial shape face higher probabilities of survival.
4.2 Bond finance, survival and the Asian crisis
The East Asian financial system suffered severe damages during the crisis primarily due to
the underdeveloped bond market and the weak banking sector. One basic premise of this
paper is that access to bond finance is associated with the establishment of reputation in the
market (Diamond (1991)). If reputational effects are in play we should expect to find bond
issuers to be less likely to fail, everything else equal. In addition, we anticipate reputation to
be of particular importance during the crisis where non-issuers, which are more informational
7According to the financial accelerator theory (Bernanke et al. (1999)), procyclical movements in the
firm’s balance sheets and net worth, and credit constraints can amplify and propagate the real or monetary
policy shock.
8The p-values for the test of equality for the coefficients on leverage and collateral are as follows: 0.007;
0.018
14
opaque and lack track record, will have a higher probability of failure.
In Table 4, columns 1 and 2, we show the direct impact of bond finance on failure as
shown in Equation (2.3). In columns 3 and 4 we present the sensitivity of firms’ survival
probabilities to bond finance during the Asian crisis as shown in Equation (2.4). All the
control and financial variables are correctly signed and retain their significance. Turning to
the results of our main interest, we observe that the coefficient on the bond issuance dummy
(column 1) exerts a negative impact on the likelihood of failure. Marginal effects suggest
that the change in the likelihood of failure associated with a change in the dummy from 0
to 1 (non-issuer to issuer) is 5%. This implies a reduction in the predicted exit probability
by 71% (5/7). Firms that are able to borrow through the issuance of bond debt are those
that can bear the significant fixed cost of accessing the bond market, which is higher than
the fixed cost of taking out a bank loan, and signal their lenders for their good reputation.
Bond-financed firms might be able to overcome any credit burden and thus they are less
likely to fail. This empirical result supports the argument of good reputation established
through bond issuance. Further, we find that bond issuers remain unaffected during the
crisis (column 3). The importance of reputation may become even more relevant during
periods of economic crises where bond issuers might be able to overcome financial problems
by extending external finance and re-negotiating existing bank loans. This finding confirms
the argument of Bolton and Freixas (2008) that ‘bond issuers are shielded from the direct
effect of a financial crisis’ (p. 37).9 The opposite is true for non-issuers (column 4). Switching
a firm’s status from bond issuer to non-issuer would raise the incidence of failure by 8%.
Having presented the beneficial effects of bond issuance, we now check whether there is a
differential impact of currency denomination of bonds on firms’ failure probabilities during
the crisis. In Table 4 we presented evidence that bond issuers are shielded from the crisis due
to reputational effects. However, one plausible question is whether this argument holds if
9It should be noted, however, that access to bond finance may not always be a panacea for all economies.
During the 1997-98 crisis, corporate bond markets were largely underdeveloped and quickly evaporated when
they needed the most. Eichengreen et al. (2006) report that bond markets in Asia were unable to provide a
“spare tyre” during the crisis and bond yields on new issues skyrocketed.
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we consider the fact that some firms were relying on bonds denominated in foreign currency
when the crisis burst in 1997. World bank (1999) reports that 58% of the long-term loans
in the East Asia and Pacific were denominated in US dollars and over 20% in Japanese yen,
whilst others were denominated in multiple currencies. The denomination of debt in foreign
currencies was also extended in bond markets. After the devaluation of domestic currencies,
indebted firms found it expensive to repay their foreign currency denominated debt.
In columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 we consider further the direct impact of bond issuance on
survival but we make the distinction between firms that issue bond debt in foreign currency
and those that issue bond debt in domestic currency. Therefore we construct the dummy
Domestic which takes the value 1 if firm i issues a domestic bond in year t, and 0 otherwise
and the dummy Foreign which is equal to 1 if firm i issues a foreign bond in year t, and
0 otherwise. We also introduce the dummy Non-issuer which takes the value 1 if firm i
never issues a bond throughout the sample period, and 0 otherwise. The latter dummy
is the omitted category in our specification. Looking at column 1 we observe that issuing
in either local or foreign currency bonds would increase survival prospects.10 Marginal
effects in column 2 reveal that changing a firm’s status from non-issuer to domestic (foreign)
bond issuer implies an increase in the likelihood of survival by 6.34% (3.17%). This finding
corroborates the reputational effect that was identified in Table 4. Next, columns 3 and 4
focus on the impact of the crisis on the hazard of failure for domestic issuers, foreign issuers
and non-issuers. To interpret the indirect effect of the crisis we interact the three dummies
with the crisis time period. The results show that domestic bond issuers are shielded from
the impact of the crisis, whilst foreign bond issuers are fully exposed to the Asian crisis.
Marginal changes reveal that the latter group of issuers faces a 3.46% higher probability of
failure during the crisis. This reflects the fact that firms with foreign denominated lending
had a particular problem since debts became much more burdensome on the firms when the
exchange rate collapsed. Lastly, non-issuers face the highest probability of failure which is
10The p-value for the test of equality for the coefficients on foreign issuers and domestic issuers is 0.000.
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close to 8%.11
5 Robustness tests
Overall, our results suggest that bond financing plays an important offsetting role in firm
survival. In this section we subject this finding to a number of checks in order to ensure
robustness. These additional checks involve estimation of our main empirical specifications
controlling for bank finance and trade credit, using proportional hazard models as well as
propensity score matching techniques. The section offers a test of robustness of the results
in Table 4 (where we look at the direct impact of bond finance on failure and its offsetting
role during the crisis) and all the reported findings are compared to Table 4.
5.1 Controlling for additional sources of external finance
Given that bond finance is not the only available option for firms’ external finance, one
concern is that other sources such as equity finance, bank finance and trade credit may
have a central place in determining business failures. Our model controls for stock market
reputation since we include the number of years a firm has been listed on the stock exchange,
but it does not explicitly account for other options of external finance. Following Mateut
et al. (2006) we consider trade credit, measured as the ratio of the firm’s trade credit to its
total liabilities, to account for firms that use trade credit as an additional source of external
finance because they cannot get credit from banks. In addition, in the absence of data on the
relationship between banks and firms we construct a bank finance variable, which is defined
as the ratio of the firm’s short-term debt to its total debt and it was firstly introduced by
Kashyap et al. (1993), to control for the fact that Asian firms rely heavily on bank loans. We
estimate therefore Equations (2.3) and (2.4) augmented with trade credit and bank finance.
We present these results in Table 6 and compare them with results in Table 4. The
11The p-value for the test of equality for the coefficients on foreign issuers and non-issuers is 0.044.
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coefficient on the bank finance is insignificant and quantitatively unimportant and this is
most likely due to the fact that we have already adequately controlled for bank loans in
our leverage variable. Trade credit is positive and significant indicating that higher levels
of debt from trade creditors would increase the probability of failure. Again, our financial
indicators appear to be important determinants of firm failures and have the expected signs.
In addition, our previous results on bond finance are re-confirmed in that bond issuers are
more likely to survive and remain largely unaffected during the crisis. On the contrary,
non-issuers are more likely to fail during the Asian crisis. In sum, we can conclude that our
core findings are not materially affected by other sources of external finance.
5.2 Proportional hazard model
While our empirical models explicitly control for endogeneity in our regressors using IV tech-
niques, firm failure studies often employ Cox proportional hazard models (e.g. Audretsch
and Mahmood (1995)). To ensure that our results are robust to hazard models we estimate
Equations (2.3) and (2.4) using the complementary log-log model (cloglog) which is equiva-
lent to the discrete time version of the proportional hazard model.12 Estimating the models
with the complementary log-log model will allow us to capture the exact time of failure and
the potential right censoring bias.
The results reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 are quantitatively and qualitatively
similar with those reported in Table 4. In particular, our financial indicators remain highly
significant and carry the expected signs. With respect to the impact of bond finance on
firm survival, we find that issuers are more likely to survive compared to non-issuers. In
order to interpret the magnitude of the estimates we calculate the exponentiated coefficient
of the bond dummy. This finding is economically important since the probability of failure
is decreasing by 60%, which is consistent with the reduction in the predicted exit probability
12Given that our data are collected on a yearly basis, the cloglog model is more appropriate compared to
the Cox model. In addition, the cloglog model has the same assumptions on the coefficient vector aˆ as the
continuous-time version of the proportional hazard model (Prentice and Gloeckler (1978)).
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in Table 4 based on the bond dummy. In addition, we continue to find that bond issuers
remain largely unaffected during the crisis, while non-issuers are more likely to fail during
the same period. We therefore conclude that the offsetting role of bond finance is robust to
an alternative estimation technique.
5.3 Accounting for bond endogeneity
It is possible that the offsetting role of bond financing in firm survival, maybe due to the
endogenous nature of bond issuance decision. To address this concern we use sampled match-
ing techniques described by Heckman et al. (1998) and recently employed in the bond IPO
literature by Hale and Santos (2009). Specifically, the propensity score matching method
estimates the probability of being a bond issuer conditional on observed pre-issuance charac-
teristics using a probit model. Once the propensity scores are calculated, we use the ‘caliper’
matching method to select the nearest control firms in which the propensity score falls within
a pre-specified radius as a match for a bond issuer.13 Therefore, we carefully construct a
sample of bond issuers and matched non-issuers, and estimate Equations (2.3) and (2.4) on
this matched sample using the propensity hazard model described above.14
Results reported in Table 8 are consistent with those presented in Table 4. The dummy
on bond finance is negative and highly significant indicating that switching from non-issuers
to issuers would directly reduce the incidence of failure. In addition, we find once again
that bond-financed firms are directly shielded from the adverse effects of the crisis, while
non-issuers are more likely to fail during this period.
13In order to match issuers and non-issuers we use the PSMATCH2 routine in Stata 10.1 described in
Leuven and Sianesi (2003). In our analysis, the pre-specified radius is set to 0.01.
14Since we aim to match a group of issuers and non-issuers with similar characteristics we report in the
Appendix mean variable differences between the two groups of firms that were successfully matched together.
It is worth noting that the matching procedure has substantially reduced the firm-level differences between
issuers and non-issuers.
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6 Conclusion
Using a novel financial dataset for five Asian economies - Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Sin-
gapore and Thailand - that were hit the hardest during the 1997-98 crisis, we find that their
survival prospects were dramatically deteriorated during this period. We find strong evidence
that the crisis affected both directly and indirectly (through interactions with financial indi-
cators) the probability of survival. Above all, we find that reputation affects positively the
likelihood of survival of firms issuing bonds in either foreign or domestic currency, whereas
only domestic issuers are shielded from the adverse effects of the crisis.
Our results have important policy implications. If access to bond finance is one factor
that could ameliorate emerging markets crises and protect firms against failures, then the
promotion of regional and well-functioning bond markets should be at the top of the pol-
icymakers’ agenda. But our results are also highly relevant for western economies which
now face the deepest recession since the second world war. They highlight the importance
of facilitating access to liquid and resilient bond markets especially when banks decide to
interrupt lines of credit during crises.
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Figure 1: Failures for Bond−Issuers and Non−issuers
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Figure 2: Number of failing firms by year
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Total Sample Failit=1 Failit=0 Diff. Bondit=1 Bondit=0 Diff.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Failit 0.103 1.00 0.000 - 0.066 0.106 0.000
(0.304) (0.00) (0.00) (0.249) (0.308)
Ageit 14.146 12.671 14.318 0.000 13.572 14.199 0.000
(4.992) (5.152) (4.945) (4.791) (5.004)
Sizeit 14.662 14.625 14.982 0.000 17.846 14.382 0.000
(3.685) (3.690) ( 3.627) (3.272) (3.587)
Leverageit 0.683 0.974 0.650 0.000 0.785 0.674 0.000
(0.915) (1.259) (0.861) (0.783) (0.925)
Profitabilityit 6.873 -11.614 9.011 0.000 1.828 7.317 0.000
(53.300) (73.505) (50.008) (37.749) (54.433)
Collateralit 0.712 0.583 0.727 0.000 0.643 0.718 0.000
(0.307) (0.386) (0.293) (0.310) (0.306)
Bondit 0.079 0.051 0.082 0.000 1.00 0.00 -
(0.270) (0.220) (0.275) (0.00) (0.00)
Crisisit 0.138 0.250 0.125 0.000 0.079 0.143 0.000
(0.345) (0.433) (0.331) (0.271) (0.351)
Observations 31134 3226 27908 2467 28667
Notes: The table presents sample means. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Failit is a dummy that equals 1 if
firm i fails in year t, and 0 otherwise. Ageit measures the number of years a firm has been listed on the stock exchange. Sizeit
is denoted by the log of real assets. Leverageit is measured as the firm’s total debt to assets ratio. Profitabilityit is the ratio
of the firm’s profits before interest and tax to its total assets. Collateralit is defined as the ratio of the firm’s tangible assets
over its total assets. Bondit is a dummy which takes the value 1 if firm i issues a bond in year t, and 0 otherwise. The Crisisit
is a dummy representing the Asian crisis and takes the value 1 in years 1997-98, and 0 otherwise. The subscript i indexes firms,
and the subscript t, time, where t = 1995-2007. Variables are measured in thousands of US dollars.
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Table 2: The direct impact of the Asian crisis on survival
Baseline Model Baseline Model Asian Crisis Asian Crisis
Endog. Probit Marginal Changes Endog. Probit Marginal Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Leverageit 0.193*** 2.690 0.180*** 2.445
(11.5) (10.6)
Profitabilityit -0.005*** -0.076 -0.006*** -0.081
(-10.3) (-11.0)
Collateralit -0.349*** -4.867 -0.332*** -4.501
(-7.21) (-6.76)
Sizeit -0.072** -1.001 -0.071** -0.960
(-2.02) (-1.977)
Size2it 0.003*** 0.045 0.003** 0.040
(2.74) (2.57)
Ageit -0.040*** -0.553 -0.039*** -0.531
(-14.8) (-14.5)
Exchanget 0.001*** 0.012 0.001*** 0.010
(5.37) (3.94)
MESj -0.348*** -4.852 -0.352*** -4.772
(-7.19) (-7.18)
Crisisit 0.452*** 7.710
(14.9)
Log − likelihood -6579 -6435
Exogeneity Test(p− values) 0.000 0.000
Observations 23558 23558
Notes: Endogenous Probit regression results and their marginal effects are reported. The dependent variable is a dummy equal
to one if the firm fails, and zero otherwise. Leverage, profitability, collateral, size and size squared are instrumented using their
lagged levels in t-1. The exogeneity test is a Wald test distributed as chi-squared under the null of exogeneity of the regressors.
Robust z-statistics are presented in the parentheses. The following countries are included in the regressions: Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Country dummies and
industry dummies are included in the model. Also see notes to Table 1.
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Table 3: The indirect impact of the Asian crisis on survival
Endog. Probit Marginal Changes
(1) (2)
Leverageit ∗ Crisisit 0.718*** 8.346
(3.50)
Leverageit ∗ (1− Crisisit) 0.093** 1.076
(2.24)
Profitabilityit ∗ Crisisit 0.002 0.025
(0.47)
Profitabilityit ∗ (1− Crisisit) -0.005** -0.055
(-2.11)
Collateralit ∗ Crisisit -1.929*** -22.431
(-7.62)
Collateralit ∗ (1− Crisisit) -1.329*** -15.458
(-11.8)
Sizeit -0.054 -0.624
(-1.23)
Size2it 0.002 0.023
(1.34)
Ageit -0.037*** -0.428
(-11.1)
Exchanget 0.002*** 0.025
(10.4)
MESj -0.165*** -1.914
(-2.74)
Log − likelihood -5286
Exogeneity Test(p− value) 0.000
Observations 20477
Notes: Endogenous Probit regression results and their marginal effects are reported. The dependent variable is a dummy equal
to one if the firm fails, and zero otherwise. Leverage, profitability, collateral, size and size squared are instrumented using their
lagged levels in t-1. The exogeneity test is a Wald test distributed as chi-squared under the null of exogeneity of the regressors.
Robust z-statistics are presented in the parentheses. The following countries are included in the regressions: Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Country dummies and
industry dummies are included in the model. Also see notes to Table 1.
25
Table 4: Bond finance, survival and the Asian crisis
Bond Finance Bond Finance Bond Finance*Crisis Bond Finance*Crisis
Endog. Probit Marginal Changes Endog. Probit Marginal Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Leverageit 0.200*** 2.758 0.181*** 2.452
(11.9) (10.6)
Profitabilityit -0.005*** -0.075 -0.006*** -0.079
(-10.3) (-11.0)
Collateralit -0.345*** -4.750 -0.334*** -4.516
(-7.10) (-6.79)
Sizeit -0.119*** -1.631 -0.075** -1.015
(-3.28) (-2.07)
Size2it 0.006*** 0.077 0.003*** 0.044
(4.61) (2.71)
Ageit -0.040*** -0.547 -0.040*** -0.535
(-14.7) (-14.5)
Exchanget 0.001*** 0.011 0.001*** 0.008
(5.37) (3.99)
MESj -0.331*** -4.552 -0.348*** -4.711
(-6.78) (-7.09)
Bondit -0.493*** -5.031
(-9.40)
Bondit ∗ Crisisit 0.193 3.000
(0.76)
(1-Bondit) ∗ Crisisit 0.466*** 8.026
(15.0)
Log − likelihood -6532 -6437
Exogeneity Test(p− values) 0.000 0.000
Observations 23558 23558
Notes: Endogenous Probit regression results and their marginal effects are reported. The dependent variable is a dummy equal
to one if the firm fails, and zero otherwise. Leverage, profitability, collateral, size and size squared are instrumented using their
lagged levels in t-1. The exogeneity test is a Wald test distributed as chi-squared under the null of exogeneity of the regressors.
Robust z-statistics are presented in the parentheses. The following countries are included in the regressions: Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Country dummies and
industry dummies are included in the model. Also see notes to Table 1.
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Table 5: Currency denomination of bonds, survival and the Asian crisis
Bond Finance Bond Finance Bond Finance*Crisis Bond Finance*Crisis
Endog. Probit Marginal Changes Endog. Probit Marginal Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Leverageit 0.201*** 2.737 0.181*** 2.453
(11.9) (10.6)
Profitabilityit -0.005*** -0.074 -0.006*** -0.079
(-10.2) (-11.0)
Collateralit -0.339*** -4.617 -0.333*** -4.509
(-6.95) (-6.78)
Sizeit -0.107*** -1.465 -0.075** -1.011
(-2.96) (-2.07)
Size2it 0.005*** 0.070 0.003*** 0.044
(4.18) (2.72)
Ageit -0.040*** -0.543 -0.039*** -0.535
(-14.7) (-14.5)
Exchanget 0.001*** 0.011 0.001*** 0.008
(5.33) (4.02)
MESj -0.342*** -4.658 -0.348*** -4.710
(-6.97) (-7.10)
Domesticit -0.792*** -6.345
(-9.29)
Foreignit -0.282*** -3.170
(-4.34)
Domesticit ∗ Crisisit -0.009 -0.128
(-0.019)
Foreignit ∗ Crisisit 0.219* 3.462
(1.82)
Non-issuerit ∗ Crisisit 0.466*** 8.027
(15.1)
Log − likelihood -6518 -6433
Exogeneity Test(p− values) 0.000 0.000
Observations 23558 23558
Notes: Endogenous Probit regression results and their marginal effects are reported. The dependent variable is a dummy equal
to one if the firm fails, and zero otherwise. Domesticit is a dummy which takes the value 1 if firm i issues a domestic bond in
year t, and 0 otherwise. Foreignit is a dummy which takes the value 1 if firm i issues a foreign bond in year t, and 0 otherwise.
Non-issuerit is a dummy equal to 1 if firm i never issues a bond throughout the sample period, and 0 otherwise. Leverage,
profitability, collateral, size and size squared are instrumented using their lagged levels in t-1. The exogeneity test is a Wald test
distributed as chi-squared under the null of exogeneity of the regressors. Robust z-statistics are presented in the parentheses.
The following countries are included in the regressions: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Country dummies and industry dummies are included in the model. Also see
notes to Table 1.
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Table 6: Robustness: Additional sources of external finance
Bond Finance Bond Finance*Crisis
Endog. Probit Endog. Probit
(1) (2)
Leverageit 0.226*** 0.207***
(12.4) (11.2)
Profitabilityit -0.006*** -0.006***
(-8.87) (-9.66)
Collateralit -0.197*** -0.180***
(-3.43) (-3.12)
Sizeit -0.038 0.007
(-0.89) (0.17)
Size2it 0.004*** 0.001
(2.75) (1.07)
Ageit -0.029*** -0.029***
(-9.64) (-9.66)
Exchanget 0.001*** 0.001***
(5.15) (3.87)
MESj -0.293*** -0.306***
(-5.54) (-5.78)
Tradeit 0.399** 0.428***
(2.48) (2.63)
Bankit 0.026 0.026
(0.34) (0.34)
Bondit -0.460***
(-8.42)
Bondit ∗ Crisisit 0.273
(1.05)
(1-Bondit) ∗ Crisisit 0.428***
(12.6)
Log − likelihood -5467 -5404
Exogeneity Test(p− values) 0.000 0.000
Observations 19888 19888
Notes: Endogenous Probit regression results and their marginal effects are reported. The dependent variable is a dummy equal
to one if the firm fails, and zero otherwise. Trade is the ratio of the firm’s trade credit over its total liabilities. Bank is defined
as the ratio of the firm’s short term debt over its total debt. Leverage, profitability, collateral, bank, trade, size and size squared
are instrumented using their lagged levels in t-1. The exogeneity test is a Wald test distributed as chi-squared under the null of
exogeneity of the regressors. Robust z-statistics are presented in the parentheses. The following countries are included in the
regressions: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%. Country dummies and industry dummies are included in the model. Also see notes to Table 1.
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Table 7: Robustness: Proportional hazard model
Bond Finance Bond Finance*Crisis
(1) (2)
Leverageit 0.230*** 0.217***
(14.1) (13.2)
Profitabilityit -0.004*** -0.004***
(-11.5) (-10.8)
Collateralit -0.661*** -0.673***
(-9.84) (-9.94)
Sizeit -0.115** -0.066
(-2.02) (-1.17)
Size2it 0.006*** 0.003*
(3.41) (1.84)
Ageit -0.082*** -0.083***
(-18.4) (-18.3)
Exchanget 0.000 -0.000
(0.84) (-0.34)
MESj -0.533*** -0.549***
(-6.49) (-6.69)
Bondit -0.870***
(-9.42)
Bondit ∗ Crisisit 0.277
(1.44)
(1-Bondit) ∗ Crisisit 0.684***
(14.8)
Log − pseudolikelihood -7841 -7799
Observations 26852 26852
Notes: Complementary log-log regression results are reported. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the firm fails,
and zero otherwise. Robust z-statistics are presented in the parentheses. The following countries are included in the regressions:
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Country
dummies and industry dummies are included in the model. Also see notes to Table 1.
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Table 8: Robustness: Accounting for bond endogeneity in a matched sample
Bond Finance Bond Finance*Crisis
(1) (2)
Leverageit 0.384*** 0.346***
(8.11) (7.17)
Profitabilityit -0.004*** -0.003***
(-3.61) (-2.77)
Collateralit -0.421* -0.278
(-1.71) (-1.18)
Sizeit 0.414* 0.290
(1.89) (1.27)
Size2it -0.009 -0.006
(-1.44) (-0.92)
Ageit -0.079*** -0.080***
(-6.21) (-5.99)
Exchanget 0.000 -0.000
(0.34) (-0.71)
MESj -0.433** -0.531***
(-2.50) (-3.12)
Bondit -0.891***
(-8.07)
Bondit ∗ Crisisit 0.265
(1.23)
(1-Bondit) ∗ Crisisit 1.196***
(8.82)
Log − pseudolikelihood -1148 -1148
Observations 4160 4160
Notes: Complementary log-log regression results on the matched sample are reported. The dependent variable is a dummy
equal to one if the firm fails, and zero otherwise. Robust z-statistics are presented in the parentheses. The following countries
are included in the regressions: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
*** significant at 1%. Country dummies and industry dummies are included in the model. Also see notes to Table 1.
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Table A-1: Mean variable differences between bond issuers and non-issuers in the pre-issuance
period, matched sample.
Mean Mean % %Bias t-test t-test
Treated Control Bias Reduction (p-value)
Leverageit 0.739 0.718 2.8 80.4 0.87 0.384
Collateralit 0.636 0.634 0.8 97.0 0.26 0.795
Profitabilityit 1.447 1.837 0.9 91.1 0.33 0.743
Sizeit 17.668 17.71 1.3 98.9 0.41 0.680
Size2it 322.88 325.18 2.2 98.1 0.66 0.511
Ageit 13.643 13.47 3.6 73.1 1.13 0.260
MESj 13.484 13.467 2.6 85.2 0.80 0.426
Exchanget 576.41 612.68 7.0 88.0 2.10 0.035
Notes: See notes to Table 1 for definition of the variables including in the matching.
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